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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from Defendant's conviction of driving while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44(2)( 1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial
District Court, Division II, Park City Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Pat Brian,
presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two issues presented in this appeal.
1.

Did the trial court fail to comply with Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

selection of a jury and Rule 4-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, jury selection, by
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obtaining law enforcement personnel and court clerks from the Summit County Courthouse
building as prospective jurors rather than summoning jurors from a qualified list? Regarding this
issue, the standard is whether the trial court substantially failed to comply with Rule 4-404, Utah
Rules of Administrative Procedure, and Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and whether
substantial injustice and prejudice resulted. State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Did the trial court misinterpret Utah law and incorrectly bar evidence on the

absorptive and metabolic rate of alcohol under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999)?
Regarding this issue the standard is,"[w]hether a statute imposes a presumption is a question of
statutory interpretation and, therefore, a question of law reviewed for correctness." State v.
Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are compiled in an appendix
where not set forth in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Samuel A. Levy, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a). Defendant pled not guilty and a jury trial was set.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Park City alleged that Defendant, Samuel A. Levy ("Mr. Levy") committed the

offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol in Park City on the evening of February
6, 1999. (Transcript p.4 lines 17-22).
2.

The prosecution offered Scott Buchanan ("Buchanan"), from the Park City Police

Department, as the city's witness. (Transcript p.5 lines 6-7).
3.

Mr. Levy, his wife, Dana Levy ("Mrs. Levy") and Denny Crouch ("Crouch")
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were offered as witnesses by the Defense. (Transcript p.5 lines 16-18).
4.

After the 11 prospective jurors were sworn in and the court had finished with

preliminary jury qualification questions the jury panel proceeded to voir dire examination.
(Transcript p.3-4; p.6 lines 8-25 through p.7 lines 1-10).
5.

The court then asked the prospective jurors: "Are any of you acquainted with any

law enforcement officer? That is, you personally knowing someone who is in the Park City
Police Department, the Summit County Sheriffs Office, the Utah Highway Patrol, the FBI, the
DEA, the CIA, anybody who is in law enforcement[?]" (Transcript p.20 lines 21-25 through
p.21 lines 1-2).
6.

Juror 11 was excused for cause after conceding that discussions with her ex-

husband, a former employee of the Los Angeles Police Department, would impugn her
impartiality in this trial. (Transcript p.23 lines 14-25 through p.24 lines 1-22).
7.

Juror 9 was excused for his experience with a past D.U.I (Transcript p. 28 lines 8-

25 through p.29 lines 1-15).
8.

The court admonished the prospective jurors about the Constitutionally time-

honored principle that the defendant's presumption of innocence remains until the defendant's
guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then asked if anyone did not understand or
agree with this fundamental presumption. Juror 3 and Juror 7 participated in separate side-bar
conferences and Juror 3 was excused for cause. (Transcript p.33 lines 1-25 through p.34 lines 125).
9.

The court asked whether any of the prospective jurors would be swayed by a

police officer's testimony simply by virtue of the witness's position as a law enforcement officer
and implored that the jury impartially "apply the same yardstick" to measure the credibility of all
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of the witnesses. (Transcript p.34 lines 16-25, p.35 lines 1-25 through p.36 lines 1-24).
10.

At this point in the jury selection process only eight prospective jurors remained

and if both counsel had exercised their three peremptory challenges then the jury pool would
have been reduced to an inadequate number. The prosecutor suggested that the Defendant waive
some the Defense's peremptory challenges. The Defendant refused. As well, the prosecution
would not waive two preemptory challenges so that the existing panel could be utilized.
(Transcript p.79 lines 15-25 through p.80 lines 1-10).
11.

The court instructed the bailiff to find more prospective jurors: "You can go to the

clerk's office, go to the sheriffs office, go over to the industrial building and you bring me four
more jurors post haste." (Transcript p.37 lines 11-15).
12.

The bailiff went through the courthouse only and returned with four prospective

jurors, all of whom worked in the Summit County Courthouse building: Jurors 12 and 13,
Summit County Justice Court Clerks; Juror 14, a Summit County Dispatcher; and, Juror 15, a
Summit County Deputy Sheriff. (Transcript p.39 line 16; p.41 line 12; p.42 lines 5-7; p.42 lines
5-6, 18-23).
13.

Except for Juror 14, the county dispatcher, all of the prospective jurors had prior

working relationships with prosecutor Christiansen and defense counsel D'Elia. In addition,
Juror 13's father was a Summit County Sheriffs Sergeant and Juror 15 was a veteran Summit
County Sheriff with 23 years under his belt. (Transcript p.43 lines 11-25; p.44 lines 1-22; p.47
lines 8-9; p.58 lines 21-24).
14.

The court noted for the record that all of the prospective jurors shared "a

livelihood in law enforcement." After questioning the group collectively as to their impartiality
as jurors the court passed them on to counsel for any reasonable questions. (Transcript p.50 lines
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21-25; p.51 lines 2-9, 25; p.52 lines 1-3).
15.

It was established through voir dire that Juror 15, Deputy Sheriff Judd, had dealt

with the arresting officer and prosecution witness, Buchanan, in a professional setting and had
formed an opinion as to his credibility. Deputy Sheriff Judd was dismissed for cause. (Transcript
p.62 lines 9-16; p. 63 lines 11-14).
16.

The prosecution passed the jury for cause. The Defense took exception to the

three prospective jurors pulled from the Summit County Courthouse building and Juror 7 who
had previously expressed reservations concerning a defendant's Constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence. (Transcript p.74 lines 4-13; p.94 lines 5-17).
17.

Regarding the three Summit County employees, the Defendant argued that while

it may be appropriate to choose prospective jurors from a qualified jury list or bring them in off
of the street, it is not appropriate to select jurors solely from the Justice Court Center and the
Sheriffs Department. The Defense explained that, inter alia, the close working relationships in
the Summit County building would cause the jurors to be partial to the prosecution's testimony.
(Transcript p.80 lines 11-16; p.87 lines 5-15; p.88 lines 5-13).
18.

The Defendant contended that under the United States Constitution and the Utah

Constitution, in the interests of fairness and due process rights, the two court clerks and the
dispatcher —Jurors 12,13, and 14— should be excused for cause, correctly reserving the
Defense's peremptory challenges for the properly selected jurors. (Transcript p.89 lines 3-25
through p.90 line 1; p. 87 lines 21-24).
19.

After noting the Defense's objections to Jurors 7, 12, 13, and 14 the court asked

the prosecution and the Defense to exercise their peremptory challenges. The jury ultimately was
comprised of the three replacement jurors selected from the Summit County Justice Center and
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one original juror from the qualified jury list. (Transcript p.95 lines 23-25; p. 100 lines 24-25
through p. 101 lines 1-11).
20.

As the trial proceeded a legal issue arose as to the admissibility of the Defense's

witness, a forensic toxicologist, Denny Crouch, and his testimony as to the Defendant's blood
alcohol concentration at the time of arrest. (Transcript p. 105 lines 21-25 through p. 106 1-25).
21.

The Defendant argued that under the prosecution's interpretation of Utah

Criminal Code §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i), the statute's wording creates a conclusive presumption that
can not be attacked on any grounds and is therefore unconstitutional. (Transcript p. 112 lines 2025, p.l 13 lines 1-25 through p.l 14 lines 1-7).
22.

The court declared "that the statute clearly says that the question's not what the

breathalyzer test was at the time of the stop, but what a breathalyzer test was within two hours of
the stop." (Transcript p.l 19 lines 2-6).
23.

The Defense proffered for the record that their expert witness would have testified

that Mr. Levy had a blood alcohol concentration of less than .08 at the time of his arrest, based
on his physical characteristics, and on the type and amount of alcohol consumed. (Transcript p.
120 lines 23-25 through p. 121 lines 1-13).
24.

The court sustained the prosecution's objection and barred any expert testimony

relevant to the Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the stop. (Transcript p. 127
lines 1-25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Under the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-404(10), calling

additional jurors, the trial court is mandated to exhaust all reasonable efforts to summon
additional jury members from a qualified jury list before resorting to extraordinary means, in
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order to ensure uniformity and administrative accountability of jury selection.
2.

The amended version of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999), driving under

the influence of alcohol, as interpreted by the trial court is unconstitutional because it invokes a
conclusive presumption.
Defendant argued that he could not be found guilty for two reasons.
1.

The Utah Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous in Rule 4-404 and the

mandatory jury selection procedure is obvious from the language used in the statute's
construction. As a matter of policy the trial court's rogue jury selection procedure undermined
the intent of the legislature to ensure uniformity and administrative responsibility in the jury
selection process. It was a substantial departure from proper jury selection for the trial court to
immediately deviate from the qualified jury list and select additional jurors exclusively from the
Justice Court office and Sheriffs office.
2.

Under Utah law a statute that triggers an irrebuttable presumption is

unconstitutional. The Defendant has a right to attack a presumption on any grounds. The trial
court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) was incorrect and the Defendant had
a right to introduce evidence on the absorptive and metabolic rates of alcohol to prove his
innocence.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH
UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 4-404 (10) AND RULE 18 UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE AND PREJUDICE TO
MR. LEVY.
The trial court failed to substantially comply with Utah law by calling additional jurors
exclusively from the Summit County Justice Center instead of from a qualified jury list and
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caused substantial injustice and prejudice to Defendant, Mr. Levy. (Transcript at 84).
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-404 (1992), jury selection and service,
states as part of its Intent: "To establish a uniform procedure for jury selection, qualification, and
service [and] [t]o establish administrative responsibility for jury selection." The procedure for
calling additional jurors states:
If there is an insufficient number of prospective jurors to fill all jury
panels, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to summon from the
qualified jury list such additional jurors as necessary. The clerk shall make
every reasonable effort to contact the prospective jurors in the order
listed on the qualified jury list.
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-404(10) (1992) [emphasis].
Only after the trial court has exhausted all reasonable efforts at contacting jurors from the
qualified jury list, "the court may use any lawful method for acquiring a jury." Id. [emphasis].
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18 (e)(4) (1999) states that a challenge for cause
may be taken against a juror for "[t]he existence of any ... relationship
between the prospective juror and any party ... which relationship when viewed objectively,
would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to
return a verdict which would be free of favoritism." [emphasis].
"The ordinary meaning of language should always be favored. The form of the verb used
in a statute, i.e., something "may," "shall" or "must" be done, is the single most important textual
consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory." Sutherland Statutory
Construction §57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992). Accord State in Interest of M.C. 940 P.2d 1229, 1236
(Utah App. 1997). In State in Interest of M.C. the Utah Court of Appeals concluded, "'[t]he term
'may,' means permissive,... 'shall,' on the other hand, 'is usually presumed mandatory and has
been interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions.'" 940 P.2d at 1236 (quoting
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Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); see also Crockett v.
Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992)).
In State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah App. 1990), the defendant challenged the
trial court's use of jurors excused on the same day, by a different judge, to fill an unanticipated
shortage of trial jurors. The Appellate Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13(4) (1987)
(which was repealed in 1992 and replaced by Rule 4-404(10) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration). The former statute stated, "[i]f there is an unanticipated shortage of available
trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, the court may require the clerk of the court to
summon a sufficient number of trial jurors [from the qualified jury list]." Suarez, 793 P.2d at 937
[emphasis original]. The Appellate Court stressed that the statute in Suarez was "couched in
permissive terms and appear[ed] to give the court some discretion on how to make up a shortage
of jurors." Id. Specifically the Appellate Court pointed out that the statute merely directs that the
court may draw jurors from the jury wheel but does not require it to do so. The Suarez court held
that "[t]he decision to utilize qualified, unused jurors who had been properly called to serve as
jurors on that day . . . " was permissible and was not a substantial departure from proper jury
selection. Id. at 938.
In the case at bar the trial court's use of jurors from the Summit County Justice Center,
instead of jurors selected from a qualified jury list, constitutes a substantial departure from
proper jury selection and less than a lawful method of acquiring a jury. In Suarez the jury
selection statute afforded the trial court discretion by stating that in the event that jurors can not
be selected from a qualified jury list then the court may require the clerk to draw more jurors
from a qualified jury wheel. Here, the current statute, Rule 4-404(10), orders the trial court that it
shall draw additional jurors from a qualified jury list and shall exhaust all reasonable efforts to
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call additional jurors from a qualified jury list before resorting to extraordinary means. In this
case there is nothing on the record to show that the clerk of the court made any attempt to
exhaust efforts to use jurors from the qualified list before resorting to the most irregular method
of pulling potential jurors from the court office and the Sheriffs office. (Transcript at 37). The
language of the jury selection statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislature's intent is
obvious from the language used that the Utah Legislature wanted to ensure "uniformity" and
"administrative responsibility" for the jury selection process. As a matter of policy the trial court
should be held to the procedure mandated in Rule 4-404 in order to ensure Due Process.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 18, selection of jury, stresses that it is proper to
challenge a juror for cause when that prospective juror's relationship to persons involved in a
trial would suggest favoritism. In the case at bar the jury panel was manipulated by the court so
that of the additional panel members, all were Summit County employees from the same
building that houses the trial court. In addition to one police officer, two were Summit County
Justice Court clerks and one was a Summit County dispatcher, and all of them had close working
relationships with law enforcement officials. (Transcript at 41-44). The trial court admitted for
the record that, "the prospective jurors have a livelihood in law enforcement, working either as a
clerk in the Justice of the Peace court or working as a dispatcher,... or working as a law
enforcement officer." (Transcript at 50-51). Reasonable minds would conclude that jurors
enmeshed in the small law enforcement community in Summit County would be unable to make
a decisionary of favoritism. The propensity for bias clearly outweighs the trial court's necessity
to resort to these additional jurors. A jury panel injected with a police officer, police dispatcher
and Justice Court employees, who were selected by the court entirely from the close-knit Summit
County law enforcement community, is a gross departure from Due Process.
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In State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503 (1997) the Utah Supreme Court adopted the cure-orwaive rule holding that the defense must exercise a peremptory challenge if one exists against
the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause in order to preserve the error on appeal. The cureor-waive rule should not preclude this appeal because the trial court substantially departed from
congressionally mandated jury selection procedures and vitiated their legislative intent. Justice
Zimmerman's prescient dissent in Baker was written with this case in mind. In response to the
Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the cure-or-waive rule and its possible negative
consequences, Justice Zimmerman implored:
We would be loath to create a mechanism that could be seen
as giving trial judges the ability to force defendants to use all their
peremptories to cure trial court refusals to strike biased jurors.
This is completely inconsistent with the fact that empanelling impartial
jurors is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge.
Baker, 935 P.2d at 511.
ARGUMENT
POINT TWO
UTAH CODE ANN. $41-6-44 (2)U)(i) CREATES AN IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UTAH LAW.
The Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) was interpreted by the trial court to
disallow any expert testimony based on the Defendant's rate of alcohol absorption or metabolism
used to establish the Defendant's actual blood alcohol concentration at the time of arrest. The
trial court's interpretation of the unconstitutional wording of the D.U.I, statute invokes an
irrebuttable presumption and violates Utah law. (Transcript at 120).
The Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999) states:
(2)
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i)
has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
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two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater;
The former statute stated:
(i)
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control;
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1998).
In State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1,6 (Utah App. 1998) the Appellate Court held "that the trial
court erred in sustaining the State's objection to evidence on the absorptive and metabolic rates
of alcohol." The Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction for driving with a
blood/breath alcohol level above the statutory limit of .08 because,"[by] erroneously invoking a
conclusive presumption, the trial court denied Preece the ability to challenge the [intoxilyzer]
test's accuracy on the ground that he absorbed alcohol after he stopped driving." Id at 7. The
Appellate Court cited City of Orem v. Crandall 760 P.2d 920, 923-924 (Utah App. 1988), to
support its conclusion that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2) "was constitutional precisely because it
carried no presumption ... and [therefore] the defendant is allowed to challenge the accuracy of
the test on any relevant ground." Id. at 6 [internal brackets removed].
The case at bar and Preece share very similar fact patterns in that both defendants were
stopped for lane violations, both had consumed alcohol only a short time before the stop, and
both were later cited for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Transcript at 103). Essentially
the only difference is that here the Defendant, Mr. Levy, is being tried under the amended
statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) (1999). The prosecution argued that the forensic
toxicologist's testimony pertaining to Mr. Levy's absorptive and metabolic rates of alcohol was
irrelevant by virtue of the conclusive statutory presumption set forth in §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i).
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(Transcript at 106). This is the same argument that was struck down in Preece where the
Appellate Court stressed that the statute was only able to withstand constitutional scrutiny
"precisely because it carried no presumption." Preece, 971 P.2d at 6. The trial court in this case
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) and incorrectly barred Defendant's expert
testimony challenging the accuracy of the intoxilyzer results.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant, Mr. Levy, should have his D.U.I, conviction reversed.
The Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's substantial departure from proper jury
selection. The trial court did not adhere to the Utah Legislature's clear and unambiguous rules
mandating jury selection procedures.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (2)(a)(i) as interpreted and applied by the trial court is
unconstitutional because it carries a conclusive presumption.
Dated this

( 3 day of January, 2000.
D'ELIA & LEHMER

Gerry ^I'Elfa
Attorney for Appellant
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